Historical Program Reviews & Reports
Federal Reviews
U.S. Department of Agriculture/Office of Inspector General’s Reviews
- Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service Evaluation of the Implementation of the Select Agent or Toxin Regulations Phase II (33601-3-AT)pdf iconexternal icon
- Follow Up on APHIS’ Implementation of the Select Agent or Toxin Regulationsexternal icon
U.S. Department of Health and Human Services/Office of Inspector General’s Reviews
- Summary Report on State, Local, Private, and Commercial Laboratories’ Compliance With Select Agent Regulations (A-04-06-01033)external icon
- Summary Report on Universities’ Compliance With Select Agent Regulations (A-04-05-02006)external icon
- Summary Report on Select Agent Security at Universities • (A-04-04-02000)external icon
- CDC Generally Met Its Inspection Goals for the Federal Select Agent Program; However, Opportunities Exist to Strengthen Oversight (OEI-04-15-00430)pdf iconexternal icon
- Entities Generally Met Federal Select Agent Program Internal Inspection Requirements but CDC Could Do More to Improve Effectiveness (OEI-04-15-00431)pdf iconexternal icon
U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO)’s Reviews
- Homeland Security: CDC’s Oversight of the Select Agent Program (GAO-03-315R)external icon
- Biological Research Laboratories: Issues Associated with the Expansion of Laboratories Funded by the National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases (GAO-07-333R)pdf iconexternal icon
- Biological Laboratories: Perimeter Security Assessment of the Nation’s Five BSL-4 Laboratories (GAO-08-1092)pdf iconexternal icon
- High-Containment Laboratories: National Strategy for Oversight Is Needed (GAO-09-574)pdf iconexternal icon
- Biological Laboratories: Design and Implementation Considerations for Safety Reporting Systems (GAO-10-850)pdf iconexternal icon
- Overlap and Duplication: Federal Inspections of Entities Registered with the Select Agent Program (GAO-13-154)external icon
- Comprehensive and Up-to-Date Policies and Stronger Oversight Mechanisms Needed to Improve Safety (GAO-16-305)external icon
- High-Containment Laboratories: Improved Oversight of Dangerous Pathogens Needed to Mitigate Risk (GAO-16-642)external icon
- High-Containment Laboratories: Actions Needed to Mitigate Risk of Potential Exposure and Release of Dangerous Pathogens (GAO-16-871T)external icon
- High-Containment Laboratories: Coordinated Actions Needed to Enhance the Select Agent Program’s Oversight of Hazardous Pathogens (GAO-18-145)external icon
Reports
- Federal Experts Security Advisory Panel Recommendations Concerning Select Agent Programpdf iconexternal icon
- National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity report: “Enhancing Personnel Reliability Among Individuals with Access to Select Agents”pdf iconexternal icon
- National Academies Committee on Laboratory Security and Personnel Reliability Assurance Systems for Laboratories Conducting Research on Biological Select Agents and Toxinsexternal icon
- National Academies Committee on Responsible Research with Biological Select Agents and Toxinsexternal icon
- Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Department of Defense Biological Safety and Security Programpdf iconexternal icon
- Report of the Working Group on Strengthening the Biosecurity of the United Statespdf iconexternal icon
- Report of the Trans-Federal Task Force on Optimizing Biosafety and Biocontainment Oversightpdf iconexternal icon
- Responsible Research with Biological Select Agents and Toxins 2009external icon
- World at Risk: The Report of the Commission on the Prevention of WMD Proliferation and Terrorismexternal icon
Page last reviewed: September 9, 2020
Content source: Division of Regulatory Science and Compliance