











Federal Select Agent Program (FSAP)

Overview
Biosafety Risk Assessment for Agriculture

2018 FSAP RO/ARO Workshop August 2018

USDA and OVERLAP SATs

USDA SELECT AGENTS AND TOXINS

African horse sickness virus African swine fever virus

Avian influenza virus³ Highly pathogenic

Classical swine fever virus

Foot-and-mouth disease virus*

Goat pox virus

Lumpy skin disease virus

Mycoplasma capricolum³

Mycoplasma mycoides³

Newcastle disease virus^{2,3} virulent

Peste des petits ruminants virus

Rinderpest virus*

Sheep pox virus

Swine vesicular disease virus

*Denotes Tier 1 Agent

USDA PLANT PROTECTION AND QUARANTINE (PPQ)
SELECT AGENTS AND TOXINS

Peronosclerospora philippinensis

(Peronosclerospora sacchari)

Phoma glycinicola (formerly Pyrenochaeta glycines)

Ralstonia solanacearum

Rathayibacter toxicus

Sclerophthora rayssiae

Synchytrium endobioticum

Xanthomonas oryzae

OVERLAP SELECT AGENTS AND TOXINS

Bacillus anthracis*

Bacillus anthracis Pasteur strain

Brucella abortus

Brucella melitensis

Brucella suis

Burkholderia mallei*

Burkholderia pseudomallei*

Hendra virus

Nipah virus

Rift Valley fever virus

Venezuelan equine encephalitis virus³


https://www.selectagents.gov/SelectAgentsandToxinsList.html

Risk Assessment

Biosofety in Microbiological and Biomedical Laboratories CDC US. DEPARTMENT OF MALTI-MIN DIMMA ISSUEDS AGEST HALFT HORD IN MARK ISSUEDS AGEST HALFT HORD IN MARK ISSUEDS

Process to identify:

- 1. Hazardous characteristics of an infectious or potentially infectious agent or material
- 2. Activities that can result in a person's exposure
- 3. Likelihood of a laboratory-acquired infection (LAI)
- 4. Probable consequences







Risk Assessment



Agriculture
Risk Assessment



- Susceptibility of multiple animal or crop species
- Geographic location
- Seasonal
- Endemic or Foreign Animal Disease
 - Economic impact (domestic)
 - Effects on international trade
 - Disease status between countries and regions within countries
 - Active control or eradication programs for the disease
















- Activities
 - in-vitro vs. in-vivo, research vs. diagnostic vs. field work
- Decontamination and Waste Management
- Inactivation for further use
- Personnel Competencies (KSAs)
- Pest Control
- Incident Response (e.g., spill)






- Animal Handling & Occupational Health
 - Large vs. small
 - livestock, wildlife, aquatic species, arthropods, nematodes
 - Zoonotic Disease
 - Availability of data
 - Medical surveillance, effective postexposure prophylaxis and treatment
 - Respiratory protection program, preexposure vaccines availability
- Relevant regulatory requirements
 - FSAP, CDC, USDA, NIH

GUIDELINES FOR AVIAN INFLUENZA VIRUSES

The Agricultural Select Agent Program has prepared Guidelines for Avian Influenza Viruses (AIV) to assist individuals and entities develop policies and implement procedures for working safely with (AIV) in the laboratory. The guidelines provide a basic understanding of AIV as velid as a basisline to meet the requirements of title 4, October 16 feeding legislations. Parts 12 (Possession, Use, and Transfer of Select Agents and Touring and Taz (Origination and Voctors).

Guidelines for Avian Influenza (Selection Selection S



Frequently Asked Questions:
Biological Safety Guidance for Research with Risk Group 3 Influenza Viruses:
Human H2N2, 1918 H1N1, and HPAI
H5N1 (wild type and mammalian-transmissible by respiratory droplets)

National Institutes of Health • Office of Biotechnology Activities

https://www.selectagents.gov/resources/AIV_Guidelines_180220.pdf https://osp.od.nih.gov/wp-content/uploads/2013/06/NIH_Guidelines.pdf



Appendix D-Agriculture Pathogen Biosafety

The contents of this Appendix were provided by USDA. All questions regarding its contents should be forwarded to the USDA.

Contents

- I. Introduction
- II. BSL-3-Aq
- III. BSL-3. Enhance
- IV. Pathogens of Veterinary Significance
- V. Summaries of Selected Agriculture Agents
- VI. Additional information

I. Introduction

Risk assessment and management guidelines for agriculture differ from human public health standards. Risk management for agriculture research is based on the potential economic impact of animal and plant morbidity, and mortality, and the trade implications of disease. Agricultural guidelines take this difference into account. Worker protection is important but great emphasis is placed on reducing the risk of agent escape into the environment. This Appendix describes the facility parameters and work practices of what has come to be known as BSL-3-Ag. BSL-3-Ag is unique to agriculture because of the necessity to protect the environment from an economic, high risk

IV. Pathogens of Veterinary Significance

African horse sickness virus a, b	Louping ill virus a
African swine fever virus a, b, c	Lumpy skin disease virus a, b, c
Akabane virus b	Malignant catarrhal fever virus (exotic strains or alcelaphine herpesvirus type 1) ^b
Avian influenza virus (highly pathogenic) a, b, c	Menangle virus ^b
Bacillus anthracis ^{a, b}	Mycobacterium bovis
Besnoitia besnoiti	Mycoplasma agalactiae
Bluetongue virus (exotic) a,b	Mycoplasma mycoides subsp. mycoides (small colony type) ^{a, b, c}


*Not all inclusive

V. Summaries of Selected Agriculture Agents

African Swine Fever Virus (ASFV)

ASF is a tick-borne and contagious, febrile, systemic viral disease of swine. 1,2,3 The ASF virus (ASFV) is a large (about 200 nm) lipoprotein-enveloped, icosahedral, double-stranded DNA virus in the family Asfarviridae, genus Asfivirus. This virus is quite stable and will survive over a wide range of pH. The virus will survive for 15 weeks in putrefied blood, three hours at 50°C, 70 days in blood on wooden boards, 11 days in feces held at room temperature, 18 months in pig blood held at 4°C, 150 days in boned meat held at 39°F, and 140 days in salted dried hams. Initially, domestic and wild pigs (Africa: warthog, bush pig, and giant forest hog; Europe; feral pig) were thought to be the only hosts of ASFV. Subsequently, researchers showed that ASFV replicates in Ornithodoros ticks and that there is transstadial, transovarial, and sexual transmission. ASF in wild pigs in Africa is now believed to cycle between soft ticks living in warthog burrows and newborn warthogs. Ornithodoros ticks collected from Haiti, the Dominican Republic, and southern California have been shown to be capable vectors of ASFV, but in contrast to the African ticks, many of the ticks from California died after being infected with ASFV. Because ASFV-infected ticks can infect pigs. ASFV is the only DNA virus that can qualify as an arbovirus.

Animal Diseases associated with Potential Bioterrorist Agents



Animal Behavior & Handling









Animal Penning, Gating & Animal Welfare



Tenderfoot flooring (rubber, no bedding)





Rubber Mating (no bedding)



Ag Biosafety

 Agriculture animals are <u>loosed-housed</u> or in <u>open caging</u> (cannot be housed in primary containment isolators or equivalent means of primary containment devices) *






ABSL-2




BSL-3Ag (11 agents)





ABSL-3





BSL-3Ag Animal Diseases



African Swine Fever




Classical Swine Fever (hog cholera)



HPAI



Rift Valley Fever



Contagious caprine pleuropneumonia



Contagious bovine pleuropneumonia



FMD



Peste des Petites Rumiants

[•] Lumpy skin disease virus


^{*} Newcastle disease (velogenic)

Risk Assessment - Plant Health

- Origin-imported or domestic
- Pure culture or fieldcollected
- Lab, growth chamber, greenhouse usage
- Vector studies
 - Arthropods, nematodes
- Trophic types
 - Obligate or facultative parasite

- Tropical vs. Temperate
- Fungal spore dispersal
- Special cases
 - Some bacteria produce endospores
 - Nematodes have resistant cysts
 - Some rust fungi have five different spores in their life cycle
 - The presence of rust alternate hosts

Risk Group Classification



FREE App

ABSA International's
Risk Group
Database app
Now available for
Apple iOS and Android devices.

To download on your device search for
"Risk Group Database" in Apple's iTunes
App Store or in the Google Play App store.

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
https://my.absa.org/tiki-index.php?page=Riskgroups

Biocontainment - Plant Health

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE ANDMAL AND PLANT HEALTH INSPECTION SERVICE PLANT PROTECTION AND QUARANTINE

CONTAINMENT GUIDELINES
For Nonindigenous, Phytophagous Arthropods
and Their Parasitoids
and Predators

, 2002 (Arthropods and their Parasites and Predators)



Containment Facilities and Safeguards for Exotic Plant Pathogens and Pests" (Robert P. Kahn and S.B. Mathur eds., 1999











http://www.aphis.usda.gov/plant_health/permits/downloads/plant_fungal_pathogens_containment_guidelines.pdf

Hazardous Characteristics of Select Agents and Toxins* (both <u>animal</u> and <u>plant</u> diseases)

SELECT AGENT OR TOXIN	ENDEMICITY INFORMATION	INFECTIOUS DOSE	LABORATORY SAFETY & CONTAINMENT RECOMMENDATIONS	TREATMENT (antidote or prophylaxis)	DISINFECTANTS
Classical swine fever virus	Endemic in much of Asia, Central and South America, and parts of Europe and Africa	10 TCID ₅₀	BSL-3 with enhancements. BSL-3-Ag & ABSL-3, both with enhancements with no contact w/ susceptible hosts for 5 days.	No treatment	Inactivated by cresol, sodium hydroxide (2%), formalin (1%), sodium carbonate (4% anhydrous or 10% crystalline, with 0.1% detergent), ionic and non-ionic detergents, strong iodophors (1%) in phosphoric acid.
Rathayibacter toxicus	Australia and South Africa	3-6 mg/kg/ body weight	BSL-2	No treatment	Alcohol

NOTE: instructional use only and does not qualify as an entity specific assessment

Procedural Risks (Examples)

Appendix II: Example Procedural Risks

		Mitiga	Mitigating Factors (A risk assessment for each experiment is necessary, as well as risk communications)			ommunications)		
			BSC/ Primary	Engineering Controls/	Biosafety SOP(s)/	Occ. Health		
	Procedural Risks*	PPE	Containment	Secondary Containment	Training	Plan	Gasket on Lid	Notes
	Propogation	Х	X	X	X			Sterility testing and use of non-viable/exempt strains
_	Lack of Appropriate Immunizations					X		
	Vortexing	Х	X	X				
<u>₽</u> 0	Centrifuging	Х	X	X	X		X	Use safety cup (if available)
	Sonicating	X	X	X	X			Use hearing protection
- 5	Pipetting	X	X	X	X			
Producing	Blending	Х	X	X	X			
F	Homgenizing	Х	X	X	X			
Aerosol I	Shakers	Х	X	x				
	Lyophilization	х	X	X	X		х	
	Flow Cytometry/ Culture Manipulation	X	X	X	X			
	Automated plating/ Plate washing	X	X	X	X			
	Spills/Splashes/Sprays	X	X	X	X			Use spill kit
	Mouth pipetting and other ingestion	^	^	^	^			OSE SPILLKIL
	forms	x			x	x		
	Cell Line/ Culture manipulation	X	х	Х	X	^		
	Pressure column chromatography	X	^	X	X			Avoid using glass columns when possible
	Injection Procedures	X			X			Avoid daing glass coldinis when possible
		_		.,				
×	Loosely Housed	X	X	X	X			
Work	Aerosol Exposure	X	X	X	X			
1 2	Bedding changing and disposal							
Ĕ.	procedures	Х	X	X	X			
Animal	Necropsy/ Harvesting tissues	Х	X	X	X			
	Animal Bites	Х	X	X	X			
	Use of Sharps	X			X			
	Inadequate Training				X			
	Inadequate Safety Equipment				X			
	Inadequate Facilities			X	X			
	Waste Handling and Inactivation							
	Procedures	X		X	X			
	Decontamination	Х			X			
	Selection and Use of PPE				X			
	Inadequate Signage/ Labeling				X			

^{*}List is non-comprehensive.

Incident Response & Reporting

- Releases (e.g., spills)
 - Outside primary containment
 - Animal disease agent
 - Zoonotic, arthropod
 - Activation of a post-exposure medical surveillance/prophylaxis protocol
 - Plant disease agent
 - Arthropod-borne disease (vector)
 - Incident reporting protocol
 - Evacuation, clean up
 - Proper disinfectant, contact time, final disposal
 - Reporting to FSAP
 - Outside secondary containment
 - Impact to environment (e.g, livestock, natural resources, cash crops, plant nursery industry, other)
 - Reporting to FESAP, other Federal and State agencies

Waste Management

Decontamination, Disinfection, and Sterilization















- Ever et. Al. (2013) Laboratory Decontamination of HHS-listed and HHS/USDA Overlap Select Agents and Toxins. Applied Biosafety. 18:2, pp. 59-72.
- Principles and Practices of Disinfection, Preservation and Sterilization, 4th Edition eds Fraise, AP, Lambert, PA and Maillard J-Y, p 565.

Risk Assessment

In addition to Biological:

- Chemical
- Radiological
- Sharps
 - Contaminated (needles, syringes, scalpels)
- Physical
 - Animal handling (bites, scratches, allergens)



Breakout Exercise:

Assessment of Risks Associated with Incident Response (e.g., spills)

Breakout session exercise

Entity ABC, a large agriculture animal health research and diagnostic campus somewhere in the Southwest, consists of multiple BSL-2/ABSL-2, BSL-3/ABSL-3, and BSL-3Ag laboratories, vivarium and associated support facilities. Several of the laboratory/animal facilities store and/or handle SATs and are registered with the FSAP. Describe the incident response and reporting procedure(s) you would have in place in the following situations:

- 1. On a Friday afternoon, an employee noticed a small air leak on top of the fermentor head plate at the start of a fermentor kill cycle. The fermentor contained *B. abortus* Strain 19 live vaccine (attenuated strain). The leak was observed as a small bubble from a pressure fitting.
- 2. One Thursday night, there was an operational failure in the effluent waste stream (EDS system that services the BSL-3Ag facility) that led to a possible release of untreated effluent into the "clean contained" portion in the building's basement. The EDS system is located in a free-standing building. Animals in the BSL-3Ag facility had been inoculated with *Brucella abortus* a few months prior the incident, and two had aborted 2 weeks prior the incident. Staff encountered the spill the following morning.
- 3. Employee was processing a diagnostic sample taken from a zoo animal that died 2 days before. The zoo is located near a region where cases of velogenic *Newcastle disease virus* (*vNDV*) have been recently reported. The sample is suspected to contain *vNDV* based on necropsy results. In the process of loading the sample from the shipping to container to the BSC, the employee inadvertently dropped it causing a spill on the floor.

Discussion

www.selectagents.gov

CDC: Irsat@cdc.gov or 404-718-2000

APHIS: AgSAS@aphis.usda.gov or

301-851-3300 option 3 (voice only)











